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Abstract 
 
The reallocation of output across plants and the productivity growth at individual plants are both 
important sources of productivity growth at the industry level. Recent evidence has shown that 
trade liberalization is related to both effects. While a trade model with firm heterogeneity can 
account for the first effect, it can not explain the second effect. We add to this model the option 
for firms to costly adopt more productive technologies and show that plant productivity actually 
rises in response to lower trade costs. Following trade liberalization, selection into exporting 
raises the market share only for some exporters. Therefore, a greater scale of operation 
amplifies their return from costly productivity-enhancement investments and leads a greater 
proportion of them to implement a more innovative technology. 
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1 Introduction
Productivity is a key element for the success of a firm in the market and forms part of the manage-
ment´s targets. Being part of the managerial strategy, it responds also to the external environment.
In particular, recent evidence has highlighted that firms have reacted to new trading opportunities
incrementing their productivity. As shown in Trefler (2004), the estimates for Canadian manufac-
turing firms in the context of Canada-US free trade area are substantial: “U.S. tariff concessions
raised labor productivity by ... 1.9 percent annually in the most impacted, export-oriented group
of industries”. Likewise - as reported by Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) - plant-productivity
improvements are associated to declining industry-level trade costs in the US manufacturing in-
dustry. Similar patterns are shown by Topolova (2004) for India, by Alvarez and Lopez (2005) for
Chile and by Bustos (2005) for Argentina.
In spite of its empirical relevance, this firm behavior is hardly explained by the recent trade
literature with heterogenous firms pioneered by Melitz (2003) and Bernard et. al. (2003). At
the heart of this literature, there is a distinct response of firms to new trading opportunities,
including entry into exporting by some and increased failure by others. Therefore, trade in these
models entails a reallocation of economic activities across firms, but do not provide any incentive
for intra-firm productivity increments.
This is also reflected at the industry level. Such reallocation of economic activity across firms
necessarily boosts industry productivity, but, in absence of within-firm productivity adjustments,
these models can not account for an important channel of industry productivity growth, which
constitutes for the bulk of overall labour productivity growth in industrial economies.1
In this paper, we focus on how trade can affect the adoption of a new technology by a firm,
just one possible option managements have to increase the firm´s productivity. We think broadly
of the adoption of a new technology, embedding all activities aimed at reducing the marginal cost
of production.2
We contribute to the literature showing that the productivity of some plants actually rises in
response to lower trade costs, so that trade models with heterogenous firms embedding an endoge-
nous technology choice are consistent with the firm-level evidence.
1See Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2004) and Trefler (2004).
2Examples are appointing a new management or chief-executers, the internal re-organization of labour, the
qualification and training of employees
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More specifically, it is sensible that a new and unexperienced firm starts up with a well es-
tablished “baseline” technology and - as in Melitz (2003)- learn about its productivity only upon
becoming operative into the market. Having assessed the firm´s potentials, the management can
target higher productivity levels and opt to costly implement an “innovative” technology, featur-
ing lower variable costs and higher implementation costs, relative to the “baseline” technology.
This trade-off shapes the "modus operandi" of the firm which constitutes the novelty of the pa-
per and reflects the endogenous technology choice available to all firms. It is very much like the
proximity-concentration trade off determining the export mode in Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple
[HMY henceforth, (2004)]. The return of a process innovation are associated to a reduction of the
variable costs and, therefore, to the firm’s scale of production.
Since trade liberalization entails a larger access to product markets and a higher demand for the
firm’s product, it increases production of domestic exporters, increasing the returns from tech-
nology adoption. A group of exporters will find the option for the innovative technology more
attractive. However, trade liberalization also increases competition, so that exporters will not
necessarily increase his sales. In addition, both adoption and exporting require extra-labour, ris-
ing labour demand, and therefore the cost of adoption. The latter effect only holds in a general
equilibrium setting, whereas it is absent in a partial equilibrium model, which abstract from factor
markets, like in Bustos (2005).
Overall trade liberalization has ambiguous effects on the innovation activity of a firm. We
show that the positive effect prevails, so that when trade costs fall, productivity can increase at
the plant level, in particular among exporters. In addition we show that selection into exporting
markets -which is related to fixed costs of export- is a necessary condition for our result to hold.
When all firms export, the effects of a larger market is perfectly offset by the increase in the mass
of competitors.3 Output and profits are then unchanged and, so are the incentives for innova-
tion. The asymmetric access to export markets limits entry within each market. Market size for
exporters rises by more than the increase in the number of competitors, expanding their outputs
and rising their incentives to innovate. This is the new and main result of our model, and mostly
important, not only holds true in the transition from autarky to trade (i.e. when a country first
opens to trade), but it also applies when transportation costs, - a proxy for trade barriers- are
reduced. It also suggests that empirical studies should control appropriately for "self-selection "
when testing the "learning by exporting" hypothesis. Finally our result is related to the effects
of trade on industry productivity.4 Not only the reallocation of activity across firms, but also
3 see Freenstra (2004). This result depends crucially on CES preferences which we assume in our model
4See Delgado et. al. (2002), Girma et. al. (2004), Alvarez and Lopez (2005) and De Loecker (2006). The self
selection hypothesis relates to the fixed cost of exporting, so that only the more productive firms can successfully do
3
intra-firm productivity growth boosts industry productivity.
Our model is closely related to some recent papers in the literature. Bernard et. al. (2006)
complement our analysis and propose the product scope of a firm as a further plausible mechanism
through which trade favours productivity increments at the plant level.
Like us, Costantini and Melitz (2007) and Atkeson and Burstein (2007) emphasize the techno-
logical side. Differently from us, the first paper focuses on stochastic innovation and analyze the
transitional dynamics induced by a trade reform. The second paper presents a general equilibrium
dynamic model of firm innovations, emphasizing the interaction of process and product innovation.
While we focus on technology adoption with firms facing a trade-off between different alternatives,
they model productivity increments as stochastic process innovations upgrading (if successful) the
technology level. Long et. al. (2007) consider instead innovation activity with firm interactions
in an oligopolistic market.
Finally, Baldwin and Nicoud (2006) and Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2006) have shown, focus-
ing on product innovation, that the dynamic positive effect of trade liberalization on aggregate
productivity growth relies on specific technological spillover. Our model instead suggests that
when firms perform vertical innovation, the selection effect could generate productivity growth by
forcing the least efficient firms out of the market, even if no technological spillover occurs. Higher
market shares incentive process-innovation leading to productivity growth.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model in the closed economy to be
compared with the open economy in Section 3. This comparison is illustrative of the effects of
trade on the firm´s choice of technology adoption and on the industry-productivity growth. The
last section concludes.
2 The Closed Economy
In this section we extend Melitz (2003) to incorporate technology adoption.
Preference
Our economy is populated by a continuum of households of measure L, whose preferences are
represented by the standard C.E.S. utility function:
it. The learning by exporting hypothesis emphasizes the possibility that exporters become more productive because
of the exposure to foreign knowledge and to a more competitive environment. In particular, all studies but Delgado
find evidence of learning by exporting when controlling for self selection.
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U =
" R
ω∈Ω
[q(ω)]ρdω
#1/ρ
where the measure of the set Ω represents the mass of available goods, 0 < ρ < 1. Households
are endowed with one unit of labour (inelastically supplied at the given wage w) and maximize
their utility subject to the total expenditure R =
R
ω∈Ω
p(ω)q(ω)dω, so that the demand function
for variety ω is:
q(ω) =
R
P 1−σ
[p(ω)]−σ (1)
where P =
" R
ω∈Ω
[p(ω)]1−σ dω
# 1
1−σ
is the price index of the economy and σ = 1/(1− ρ) > 1 is
the elasticity of substitution across varieties.
Technology
Each variety is produced by a single firm according to a technology for which the only input
is labour. The total amount of labour required to produce the quantity q(ω) of variety ω is given
by
l(ω) = fD + cq(ω) (2)
where fD is the fixed labour requirement and c ∈ [0, c] the firm-specific marginal labour
requirement5.
Entry - Exit
There is a large (unbounded) pool of prospective entrants into the industry and prior to entry,
all firms are identical. To enter the industry, a firm must make an initial investment, modelled
as a fixed cost of entry fE > 0 measured in labour units, which is thereafter sunk. An entrant
then draws a labour-per-unit-output coefficient c from a known and exogenous distribution with
cdf G(c) and density function g(c) on the support [0, c]. Upon observing this draw, a firm has
three options. Like in Melitz (2003), it may decide to exit or to produce. If the firm does not exit
and/or produces, it bears the fixed overhead labour costs fD. Additionally to Melitz (2003), by
investing fI units of labour, it can opt for adopting a more productive technology and produce at
a lower cost γc (γ < 1). Ultimately, it is a choice among a well established "baseline" technology
- characterized by low "implementation" costs, normalized to 0, and variable costs of production
c - and, an innovative one - featuring lower variable costs (γc), but higher fixed cost of adoption
5Clearly, this technology exhibits increasing return to scale. fD can be thought as all those activities like
marketing or setting up a sales network which are independent of the scale of production. Then, it can be seen as
the fixed cost of serving the domestic market. The inverse of c is a measure of a firm’s productivity in the production
process.
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(fI). The trade-off being between efficiency-implementation costs, much like of the proximity-
concentration trade off for horizontal FDI in HMY (2004).
We are assuming that technological uncertainty and heterogeneity of the Melitz-type relates to
what we have called a "baseline" technology, reflecting that firms have to learn about their market
and their productivity before they can plan to improve it. Having found out about their idiosyn-
cratic productivity, all firms face the option of adopting an alternative technology, what we have
referred to as the "innovative" one. While the extra fixed cost is the same for each firm, the reduc-
tion in variable cost is proportional to the firm’s idiosyncratic "marginal cost draw" given from its
own entry. Since the Melitz-type entry leads to heterogeneity in variable cost, the technological
option results also differently attractive for different firms, relative to their "baseline" technologies.
This could be rationalized as some firms being more successful than others in implementing the
new technology. Indeed, technology-implementation requires an active engagement of the adopter
- namely a series of investments undertaken by the adopter - beyond the selection of which technol-
ogy to adopt. These investments are often label "technology implementation process" which are
in the data the main source of site-to-site variations in the success (productivity) of the adopter,
better implementation makes new technologies more productive.6
The consumers may benefit from this form of innovation in the form of a reduction of good
prices. We shall refer sometimes to this reduction of costs in the production stage with an abuse
of terminology as process or vertical innovation .
Finally, as in Melitz (2003) every incumbent faces a constant (across productivity levels) prob-
ability δ in every period of a bad shock that would force it to exit.
Prices and Profits
A producer of variety ω with labour-output coefficient c faces the demand function (1) and
charges the profit maximizing price:
p(ω) =
σ
σ − 1wc ≡ pD(c) (3)
where σσ−1 is the constant markup factor and w is the common wage rate, hereafter taken as
the numeraire (w = 1). The effective price (3) charged to consumers by non-innovator is higher
than the price pI(c) = γpD(c) charged by an innovator. Substituting (3) in (1), the output of a
non-innovator is:
q(ω) = A
∙
σ
σ − 1c
¸−σ
≡ qD(c) (4)
6See Comin (2007) and Bikson et. al. (1987).
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and likewise, qI(c) = γ−σqD(c) for an innovator. Therefore, the profit of firm type D (producer
with a "traditional" technology) and firm type I (firm with innovative technology) are:
πD(c) =
rD(c)
σ
− fD = Bc1−σ − fD (5)
πI(c) =
rI(c)
σ
− fD − δfI = B(γc)1−σ − fD − δfI (6)
where rs(c) = ps(c)qs(c), s = D, I is the revenue of firm type s and B = (1/σ) RP 1−σ
³
σ
σ−1
´1−σ
is
taken as a constant by a single producer and it represents the level of demand in the country.
The innovation cost fI into the profit function is weighted by the exogenous probability of exiting,
because the innovation decision occurs after firms learn about their productivity c and since there
is no additional uncertainty or time discounting other than the exogenous probability of exiting,
firms are indifferent between paying the one time investment cost fI or the per-period amortized
cost δfI . We shall adopt the latter notation for analytical convenience.
For illustrative purpose, let us consider in figure 1 the profit profiles associated to the two
possible technology choice. From the prospect of a single firm, (5) and (6) are linear in c1−σ which
can be interpreted as a firm’s productivity index: the higher it is, the greater the productivity of a
firm.7 Given the fix overhead cost of innovation and that the profit of an innovator is always steeper
than a non-innovator’s one, technology adoption will be profitable only for high-productivity firms.
Firms with draws below (co)
1−σmake negative profit and have to exit, while firms with productivity
index above (co)
1−σ entry successfully. Only a fraction of these firms (c1−σ ≥ (cI)1−σ), perform
also process-innovation.
Using (4) and (3), we have the ratio of any two firms’s output and revenues only depend on
the ratio of their productivity levels:
q(c1)
q(c2)
=
∙
c1
c2
¸−σ
,
r(c1)
r(c2)
=
∙
c1
c2
¸1−σ
(7)
(7) has some interesting implications. First, dividing numerator and denominator of the quan-
tity ratio by Q and the numerator and the denominator of the revenue ratio by R, we can conclude
that relative market shares of the firms depends only on the cost ratio and is independent of aggre-
gate variables. Second, rI(c)/rD(c) > 1, that is rent increases more than proportionally following
the introduction of process innovations.8
7B is an endogenous variable of the model and it is a non linear function of c. However, from a single firm’s
prospect, B is taken as given and therefore, it can be treated as a constant. This graph can not be used for
comparative statistic or to pin down equilibrium values, but it is useful to understand the behavior of a firm with
a productivity draw c.
8Note that rI(c)/rD(c) = γ1−σrD(c)/rD(c) = γ1−σ > 1, since σ > 1 and γ < 1.
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Figure 1: Profits from producing and innovating on the domestic market.
2.1 Equilibrium in a closed economy
We are interested in a stationary equilibrium where the aggregate variables must also remain
constant over time. As in Melitz (2003), this requires a mass Me of new entrants in every period,
such that the mass of successful entrants, MeG(co), exactly replaces the mass δM of incumbents
who are hit by the bad shock and exit, .
The equilibrium entry cost-cutoff co and innovation cost-cutoff cI must satisfy:
πD(co) = 0⇐⇒ B (co)1−σ = fD (8)
πI(cI) = πD(cI)⇐⇒ (γ1−σ − 1)B (cI)1−σ = δfI (9)
Since their productivity is unrevealed upon entry, firms will compare the expected profit in
the industry with the entry cost, taking into account the possibility of being hit by a bad shock.
Free entry ensures the following equality :
∞P
t=0
(1− δ)t
"
cIR
0
πI(c)dG(c) +
coR
cI
πD(c)dG(c)
#
= fE
or:
δfE =
cIR
0
πI(c)dG(c) +
coR
cI
πD(c)dG(c) = πG(co) (10)
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which states that firms equate the per-period expected profit from entering and the equivalent
amortized per-period entry cost. The last equality is derived in the appendix with π denoting
the average profit in the industry and shows that following an increase in the per-period entry
cost δfE , firms are willing to enter if they can expect either a higher per period average profit or
greater chances of entry (higher co).
(8) to (10) characterize the equilibrium cost-cutoffs co and cI as well as B.
Combining (8) with (9) we have the relation between the innovation and the entry cutoff:
(cI)
1−σ =
δfI
γ1−σ − 1
1
fD
(co)
1−σ = Ψ (co)
1−σ (11)
where δfIγ1−σ−1 is the cost to benefit ratio of innovation. The numerator is the per-period cost
of innovation while the denominator represents the revenue differential of innovation per unit of
revenue initially earned. It follows that a necessary and sufficient condition to have selection into
the innovation status is Ψ > 1, which is assumed to hold throughout since the empirical evidence
suggests that only a subset of more productive firms undertakes process innovations9.
Given (11), (10) is a function of only co. The equilibrium is depicted in figure 2, where the
flat line δfE crosses the LHS of (10) which is monotonically increasing from 0 to infinity in c, as
proved in the appendix. The graph clearly highlights that co has to rise when the fixed cost of
entry increases, as discussed above.
More interesting is an increase of fD - the degree of increasing return to scale - or, alternatively,
conceivable as the cost of staying in the industry. This thought experiment has strong analogies
to the effects of trade liberalization in our open economy analyzed next, as both exercises have in
common that they make survival of domestic firms harder (selection effect). More specifically, a
greater fD lowers Ψ, but it also shifts up the LHS curve in fig. 2, so that it reduces the entry cost-
cutoff to c
0
o (see(35) in the appendix). Overall, the effect of an increase in fD on the innovation
productivity cutoff (cI)
1−σ is ambiguous since Ψ is lower, but (co)
1−σ is larger. This ambiguity is
a specific-feature of a general equilibrium model, whereas in partial equilibrium the effect of fD
would be well determined and would affect the economy only through Ψ. The intuition comes
from inspecting (5) and (6). A larger fD reduces the profits of all firm types in the economy
for any given c, forcing the least productive firms out of the market given that they are unable
to recoup the increased fixed cost of operation. Selection reduces the mass of firms followed by
a reduction in the price index P , making possible for incumbent firms to expand their output
and, consequently, increase their innovation profits (higher B). This is the pro-innovation effect
9See for instance Parisi et. al. (2005) for evidence on Italian firms and Baldwin et al. (2004) for evidence on
Canada.
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Figure 2: Determination of the equilibrium entry cost cutoff as given by the Free Entry Condition
through selection behind the reduction of Ψ. However, labour demand by innovating firms and
potential entrants raises, putting upward pressure on the labour-factor market, leading to a higher
real wage (1/P ). As a result, profits are reduced (through the B). This is the general equilibrium
effect via the factor market behind the rise in c1−σo and it would be absent in partial equilibrium
since the equilibrium wages are unchanged.
The net effect will depend on the relative strength of the two sides of selection. These two
offsetting forces on the innovation activity will also be at play in the more complex scenario of an
open economy which undergoes through trade liberalization.
Note that the entry productivity cutoff level is higher in our economy than in Melitz (2003).10
The possibility to innovate allows the most efficient firms that perform process innovation to
"steal" market shares to the least efficient firms for which is harder to survive into the market.
Consequently, our economy is more efficient, because some varieties are produced at a lower cost,
but less varied because some varieties have disappeared. This trade-off has been well emphasized
in the growth literature (see Peretto (1998) and more recently Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2006)).
10The proof of this result has been left to the appendix.
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3 The Open Economy
Let us assume that the economy under study can trade with other n ≥ 1 symmetric countries. We
will assume that trade is not free, but it involves both fixed and variable costs. One can think of
the fixed cost associated to trade as the cost of customizing its own variety to the regulations and
tastes of foreign countries as well as of creating sale-networks. The variable trade costs are trade
or legal barriers such as transportation costs imposed or tariffs. We follow a long tradition in the
trade literature and model these variable costs in the iceberg formulation: τ > 1 units of a good
must be shipped in order for 1 unit to arrive at destination.
Finally, the symmetry of countries is required to ensure that factor price equalization holds and
countries have indeed a common wage which can be still taken as the numeraire.11 The symmetry
assumptions also ensures that all countries share the same aggregate variables.
Prices,Profits and Firm-Types
The imported products are more expensive than domestically produced goods due to trans-
portation costs. As a result, the effective consumer price for imported products from any of the
n countries is pX(c) = τpD(c), while an exporter who has opted for process innovation charges
pXI(c) = γpX(c). The profits of an exporter and an innovator-exporter in a foreign market are:
πX(c) = τ
1−σBc1−σ − δfX (12)
πXI(c) = (γτ)
1−σBc1−σ − δfX (13)
where δfX is the amortized per-period fixed cost of the overhead fixed cost fX that firms have to
pay (in units of labour) to export to foreign markets.12
No firm will ever export and not also produce for its domestic market. Indeed, any firm
would earn strictly higher profits by also producing for its domestic market since the associated
variable profit rD(c)/σ is always positive and the overhead production cost fD is already incurred.
Moreover, since the export cost is assumed equal across countries, a firm will either export to all
n countries in every period or never export.
The empirical evidence suggests that exporting and innovation are performed by the most
productive firms (lowest cost levels), while domestic producers are typically smaller, less innovative
and less productive. Accordingly, we shall focus on the selections with the exporters or the
11Alternatively, a freely traded homogenous good produced under constant return to scale could be introduced to
pin down its price and thus the wage to unit in all countries.
12Note we account for the entire overhead production cost in the domestic profit (see (5) and (6)). This choice is
uninfluential for the equilibrium as all firms (domestic producers and exporters) will produce also for the domestic
market and incur fD upon staying into the industry.
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innovators being the most productive types. In selection BW in figure 3, exporting is relatively
cheaper than innovating and therefore only the most productive exporters can undertake vertical
innovation: an innovating firm is necessarily an exporter (XI-type), but there are exporters that
are not innovators (X-type).13 Indeed, from (12) and (13) it is easy to check that if the X-type
is making positive profit from exporting, then also the XI-type does necessarily so. However, no
innovator would produce and innovate just for the domestic market (no I-type) because given her
high productivity she would give up positive profits from not meeting the foreign demand.
BW)
B)
xcIc oc
ocIcxc
Figure 3: Plausible selections
On the contrary, in selection B only a fraction of incumbents innovate (I-type) and only a
subset of innovators become exporters (XI-type). No firm will ever export without innovating
(no X- type). Indeed, firms that can take advantage of profit opportunity abroad are already
innovating on the domestic market. Therefore they will exploit their innovative technology to
serve the foreign market as well.
BW is interesting because the marginal innovating firm is an exporter and trade will likely
affect its innovation decision. B represents the other side of the same coin: the marginal innovating
firm is a domestic producer and therefore, innovation is mostly determined by domestic factors
and will less likely respond to trade liberalization.
Given the aim of the paper, we focus closely on selection BW where trade induces within-
13This is different from Yeaple (2005) where the firm type adopting the innovative technology is also necessary an
exporter. In other words, the exporting firms coincides with the innovative types and therefore, no selection on the
basis of innovation status is possible.
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plant productivity changes besides allocative effects of market shares. Then, we turn to discuss
briefly selection B and highlight why trade is not influential on plants’ innovation activity. In this
equilibrium, trade affects productivity only through allocative effects.
3.1 Selection BW
We are again interested only in a stationary equilibrium where all aggregate variables are constant
over time, i.e. δM = MeG(co). Note that the equilibrium value of the aggregate variable Q, R,
and therefore A and B as well as of the entry cutoff co is different in this equilibrium from the
closed economy one. Nevertheless we stick to same notation as they are defined in the same way.
Cutoffs in equilibrium BW must satisfy the following conditions:
πD(co) = 0⇔
rD(co)
σ
= B (co)
1−σ = fD (14)
πX(cX) = 0⇔
rD(cx)
σ
= Bc1−σX =
δfX
τ1−σ
(15)
πI(cI) + nπXI(cI) = πD(cI) + nπX(cI)⇔
rD(cI)
σ
= B (cI)
1−σ =
δfI
(γ1−σ − 1)(1 + nτ1−σ) (16)
Thus the parameter restriction that sustains this equilibrium (cI ≤ cX ≤ co) where only
exporters perform process innovation must satisfy:
δfI
(γ1−σ − 1)
1
(1 + nτ1−σ)
≥ δfXτσ−1 ≥ fD (17)
This condition requires innovating being relatively more expensive than exporting. That is,
foreign markets should be fairly accessible, otherwise serving them would result extremely costly
and it could be afforded exclusively by innovators.
δfI
(γ1−σ−1) is equivalent to the cutoff for innovation for the closed economy: the same assumptions
that guarantees selection on the basis of innovation status in the closed economy (i.e., Ψ ≥ 1)
ensures that this term is positive and bounded away from zero in the open economy. Recall that
this term represents the cost to benefit ratio of innovation. Importantly, in the open economy we
have an extra term given by 1(1+nτ1−σ) which is unity in the closed economy (set n = 0 or τ →∞).
The denominator represents precisely the further revenue differential associated to innovation on
each of the foreign markets that become available with trade.
We like to think of n as the number of countries into the trading network sharing a common
code of rules as it could be for the WTO members. Then, it represents a measure of the world’s
openness to trade, as for a low n very few countries have trading relations. φ = τ1−σ ∈ [0, 1] is
commonly referred in the literature as an index of the freeness of trade with values closer to 1
indexing freer trade.
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Clearly, trade liberalization that come in the form of either freer trade (greater φ) or greater
world openness (larger n) can affect process innovation weighing upon the return of innovation.
(14) to (16) give a system of 3 equations in 4 unknowns (co,cX ,cI ,B). The FE condition:
coR
cX
πD(c)dG(c) +
cXR
cI
(πD(c) + nπX(c))dG(c) +
cIR
0
(πI(c) + nπXI(c))dG(c) = δfE (18)
closes this system and the cost cutoffs can be uniquely determined. Combining appropriately
the three conditions for the cutoff points ((14) to (16)), the relation between the cutoffs can be
written explicitly as:
(cI)
1−σ =
δfI
(γ1−σ − 1)(1 + nτ1−σ)
1
fD
(co)
1−σ = Ψf (co)
1−σ (19)
(cI)
1−σ =
δfI
(γ1−σ − 1)(1 + nτ1−σ)
1
δfXτσ−1
c1−σX = (Ψ
f
X)c
1−σ
X (20)
c1−σX =
δfXτσ−1
fD
(co)
1−σ (21)
Note that Ψ = Ψf (1 + nτ1−σ) and ΨfX = Ψ
ffD/δfXτσ−1. Ψ ≥ Ψf - namely, the cost to
benefit ratio is smaller in the trading equilibrium than in autarky - reflects that trade and vertical
innovation are related: new market opportunities abroad induce exporters to expand their scale
of operation, so that the benefits of cost-reducing innovation are spread on a greater number of
units, while the up-front cost of innovation is unchanged. Comparing (19) with (11) shows trade
(for positive n and non-prohibitive transportation cost τ) reduces, ceteris paribus, the innovation
productivity cutoff (cI)
1−σand therefore it boosts within-plant innovation. This is the partial
equilibrium effect described also in Bustos (2005).14
However, this is not enough for concluding the proportion of incumbents undertaking produc-
tivity innovation will be larger after trade. In general equilibrium, trade affects also the entry
productivity cutoff (co)
1−σ which results higher in the trading equilibrium than in autarky (selec-
tion effect), as it is shown in the appendix.
As discussed above , two forces are affecting the innovation cost cutoff when the economy opens
to trade:
i) the selection effect and, the asymmetric access to exporting markets, together increase ex-
porters’ total market shares, rising the benefit of cost-reducing innovation. Thus, some
incumbent will start performing vertical innovation - Ψf < Ψ.
14This situation would describe an industry within the economy which is small enough to affect the equilibrium
wages of the economy, and where no entry and exit takes place.
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ii) Exporters, innovators and potential entrants, exacerbate the competition for the scarce
labour input and push up the real wage. Survival becomes tougher (c1−σo increases), and
exporting and innovating more costly.
The latter effect occurs through the input-factor market and, therefore, only in a general
equilibrium setting. It would be necessarily absent in a partial equilibrium approach since the
equilibrium wage in the industry is unaffected.
The overall effect of trade on innovation is ambiguous and depends on the relative strength of these
pushing and deterring factors of process innovation, similarly to the effect of an increase in fD
above. Although the proportion of incumbents is reduced (lower co), the proportion of innovating
firms among them will raise (higher cI) if i) dominates ii), namely if the adjustments through the
extensive margin of innovation dominate those through the extensive margin of trade.
In order to shed some light on which effect dominates, we use a specific parametrization for
G(c). We shall show that the net outcome of these two offsetting forces is a higher proportion of
firms performing process innovation with freer trade.
Assuming that the productivity draws (1/c) are distributed according to a Pareto distribution
with low productivity bound (1/c) and k ≥ 1, the c.d.f of cost draws c is given by:
G(c) =
³c
c¯
´k
, k > σ − 1, k > 2. (22)
This formulation has been used widely in many extensions of Melitz (2003) because it allows to
derive closed form solutions for the cutoff levels.15 k is a shape parameter indexing the dispersion
of cost draws. k = 1, corresponds to the uniform distribution. As k increases, the distribution
is more concentrated at higher cost level and firms’ heterogeneity is reduced. k > 2 ensures that
the second moment of the distribution is well defined, while k > σ − 1 ensures the first moment
of the truncated distribution ((25) and (26) in the Appendix) exists and is well defined. With
this assumption, we are able to prove trade liberalization favours technology adoption by some
exporters, as established in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Denote with cAI (c
f
I ) the equilibrium innovation cost cutoff in autarky (in the open
economy). If (22) and (17) hold, then the innovation cost cutoff in the open economy is larger
than in autarky (i.e cAI < c
f
I )
Proof. See appendix.
15See for example Melitz and Ottaviano (2005).
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Interestingly, selection into exporting is playing a key role and is related to fX . In absence of it
and with CES preferences, trade liberalization does not have an impact on cI . Without selection
to export markets (fx = 0), all firms exports and perfectly compensates for the loss in the domestic
market shares with gains in foreign market shares, since the increase in each firm’s market size
after trade is exactly offset by the rise in the number of competitors. This can be easily checked
inspecting the equilibrium conditions. With fx = 0, (14) becomes (1 + nτ1−σ)Bc1−σo = fD which
together with (16) and (18) characterize the equilibrium and determines (co, cI , B). It is easy to
show that such equilibrium is equivalent to the autarky one described by (8)-(10), so that no new
firm innovates after engaging in trade. However, when fX > 0, there is selection on the export-
status with only some firms engaging in exporting, while the least productive ones serve only
the domestic market. This means that, following trade liberalization, the increase in market size
for the exporting firms is no longer perfectly offset by the raised number of competitors because
the increase in the mass of exporters is lower. As opposed to fx = 0, some domestic exporters
are enjoying a larger slice of both the domestic and foreign market, as they are not facing the
competition from the actual domestic producers (previously also exporting) and, at the same
time, (by symmetry) are confronted with less foreign competitors on the national market. This
is the basic economic intuition behind i) above and it is strictly related to the existence of fixed
trade costs.
Despite the general equilibrium effect, trade translates into net gains for the most produc-
tive non-innovating exporting firms, inducing them to implement the innovative technology, as
we can conclude from showing that i is dominating ii. As low productive domestic firms exit,
their market shares are reallocated to the most productive surviving incumbents, and thus, also
to some domestic exporters (extensive margin effect or selection effect). This effect adds up to the
intensive-margin effect or scale effect - that following trade liberalization, some exporters have
increased their market share abroad. As a result, their combined market share (the sum of the
domestic and foreign market shares) enlarges. Since a larger scale of operation is associated to a
greater return of the "technological option", a larger fraction of them finds profitable to implement
the innovative equipment. In other words, trade affects the extensive margin of innovation induc-
ing exporting firms that are not as productive as former innovators, to adopt more productive
technologies.
We would expect that the reduction of transportation costs which lead to trade creation in
this model have similar effects on innovation, consistently with the evidence in Bernard et. al.
(2006). This is established in the following Lemma.
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Lemma 2 Assume (22) and (17) hold, dcI/dτ ≤ 0.
Proof. See in the appendix
Trade liberalization taking the form of partial tariff reform, as often it is in practice, induce
similar positive effect on process innovation, according to our model. For instance, we can eval-
uate the effects of Canada-US FTA (CUSFTA) on within firm performances. τ in (19) is the
transportation cost faced by Canadian manufacturing firms exporting to US. The model predicts
US tariff concessions granted to Canada - a reduction of τ - after the FTA would induce some
Canadian exporters to innovate, as they can take advantage of a lower cost to benefit ratio. This
is consistent with the evidence shown in Trefler (2004).
Interestingly, firms adopting the innovative technology are the high productive non-innovating
exporters, while some less productive exporters keep the "traditional" technology even after trade
liberalization, consistently with the evidence shown in Bustos (2005) and Fryges and Wagner
(2007).16
Summing up, by increasing the scale of production of some of the exporters, trade increases
what Cohen and Klepper (1996) call the "ex ante" output - the firm’s output when it con-
ducts process innovation. This, in turn, raises firms’ incentive to innovate and triggers process-
innovation, productivity increments and market share growth at firm level (see (7)). This is
consistent with Baldwin and Gu (2003) and Trefler (2004) who find that within-firm productiv-
ity increments have occurred mostly among exporters. Moreover, Baldwin (2004) finds empirical
support for such casual link: vertical innovation is a main determinant of productivity growth and
productivity growth induces market share growth17.
Finally, the reduction of transportation costs has contrasting effect on cX too. A reduction
of trade barriers have a direct effect and lowers the exporting productivity cutoff c1−σX (see (21)),
but also an indirect effect through (co)
1−σ which rises this threshold. The following lemma shows
that the direct effect dominates the indirect one, going in the same direction as in Melitz (2003).
Lemma 3 Assume (22) holds, dcX/dτ ≤ 0.
Proof. See the appendix
16Also in Yeaple (2005), lower transportation costs induce a greater adoption of the innovative technology. How-
ever, no exporters retain the old technology as found in Bustos (2005).
17Baldwin (2004) finds Canadian process-innovators had productivity growth that was 3.6 percentage points higher
than Canadian non-process innovators (table 9). Moreover, a within-firm productivity increment of 10% relative to
the industry average translate into almost 2% gain in the firm’s market share (table 12).
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In the context of CUSFTA, this lemma predicts that some Canadian manufacturing firms
which are not as productive as established exporters, will also start to serve the US market in
virtue of the American preferential tariff reform. Interestingly, Baldwin et al. (2003) find evidence
of this.
3.2 Selection B
We shall just show that trade in this equilibria can not affect the extensive margin of innovation
as for selection BW. The non-innovating firms are only the D-type, while the innovating firms are
the I-type and the XI-type, but only the latter are present on international market. There is no
X-type.
The cutoff conditions for equilibrium B are:
πD(co) = 0 (23)
πI(cI) = πD(cI) (24)
πXI(cX) = 0⇔ Bc1−σX = (τγ)
σ−1δfX
which imply that the necessary and sufficient condition for cX ≤ cI ≤ co is:
δfXτ
σ−1 ≥ δfI
(γ1−σ − 1)γ
1−σ ≥ fDγ1−σ
This equilibrium is characterized by a trading cost relatively higher than the innovating one.
High variable and fixed cost of exporting make trading a very expensive activity performed only
by the most productive firms.
Note also that (23) and (24) imply the same relation among the innovation and the entry cutoff
as in the closed economy given by (11). Indeed, the marginal innovating firm is not an exporter
and the transition from autarky to trade leaves the cost to benefit ratio of innovation unchanged.
That is, trade liberalization can not affect and stimulate firms’ innovation investments because it
has no impact on Ψ. In other words, the extensive margin of innovation responds to lower trade
barriers uniquely through the selection effect (ii, above); consequently, a raise in c1−σo raises c
1−σ
I
as well and depresses vertical innovation.
3.3 Final Remarks
The model has implications on the aggregate productivity level. As in Melitz (2003), the industry
average productivity will be rising in the long run by means of the selection effect which expels the
least efficient firms out of the market - between effect . Moreover, in our model trade will rise the
average industry productivity through a further channel, namely the within effect (Proposition 1
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and Lemma 2). Following trade liberalization, some of the exporters opt for implementing a more
efficient technology, improving their productivity level.
This is relevant also for the second moment of the industry productivity distribution. The
dispersion of productivity levels among innovators and non-innovators increases, implying a higher
variance. Depending on the strength of this effect, the standard prediction in the literature of a
smaller variance due to the selection effect of trade could be overturned.
More generally, a greater openness in the trading relations can justify the finding of the great
importance of the within component for the industry productivity growth, as recently documented
in Bartelsman et. al. (2004).
Finally the model suggests that trade liberalization and the geography of a country can interact
each other: the same trade liberalization may induce different innovation outcomes depending on
the location of a country.
Moving from B to BW, the cost of exporting relative to the cost of innovating decreases.
This means that the effect trade has on the process innovation will be differentiated according to
the level of transportation cost. We shall interpret high transportation cost as a proxy for the
remoteness of the Home economy from the main exporting markets or, more generally, as the level
of trade barriers faced by the Home country.
If in the transition from autarky to trade, the country is fairly remote and faces selection
B, then process innovation performed will be reduced, as discussed above. On the contrary, if
the country is close to the exporting markets and selection BW is possible, process innovation
increases.
This result is close to what Long et. al. (2006) find for an oligopolistic market structure. In
their model, a reduction of transportation cost for an initial low level of it, increases the firm´s
R&D spending for productivity improvements, whereas for a high level of initial transportation
cost, the reverse holds true, namely R&D spending is reduced following trade liberalization.
4 Conclusion
The paper introduces process innovation into the Melitz (2003) framework. As in Melitz (2003),
trade has a selection effect on firms forcing the least productive ones out of the market and
reallocating market shares to the most productive ones. Although this contributes to the aggregate
productivity growth, it is not exhaustive of the effects of trade on productivity. We showed that
the same selection effect of trade can favour the adoption of an innovative technology, especially
among exporters.
One could think that fiercer competition implied by trade can reduce the incentive for in-
19
novation. This is certainly true for low productive domestic firms whose survival possibilities
have decreased together with their market shares. Instead, due also to selection, the exporters
compensate the loss of market shares in the domestic market with gains in market shares in for-
eign markets. Selection expand their scale of production, their incentive for process innovation
strengthens and some of them introduce a more productive technology.
In productivity studies, this is the so called within effect - some of the incumbent firms update
their productivity - and it is a main source of labour productivity growth in industrialized countries.
This is the new insight of the model: trade contributes to the industry productivity growth through
the within effect besides through the between effect. More generally, a greater openness in the
trading relations can justify the finding of the great importance of the within component for the
industry productivity growth, as recently documented.
We have shown that the technology adoption response of firms to trade is the net outcome
of two different effects: one favouring innovation and related to one side of trade liberalization,
namely the opportunity of market expansion; the other one, deterring innovation and related to
the other side of the coin, namely a tougher competition on the good market and in the input
markets. In particular, it was highlighted that the second effect is specific to general equilibrium
as it comes through the interactions with the input-factor market.
Finally, geography plays an important role. Trade liberalization can depress vertical innovation
(equilibrium B) for remote countries, while it can boost process-innovation (equilibrium BW ) for
countries closely located to the core of the exporting markets.
5 Appendix
Note that we shall use a superscript A to denote the equilibrium variables in the closed econ-
omy and f for the the equilibrium variables in the open economy whenever we have to compare
quantities from the two equilibrium.
5.1 Appendix A - Closed Economy
Cost distribution and productivity indexes
Let us denote by µD(c) and µI(c) respectively, the cost distribution of domestic producers and
active innovator prior to innovation.
µD(c) =
g(c)
G(co)−G(cI)
o
,
cI < c < co
otherwise
(25)
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µI(c) =
g(c)
G(cI)
o
,
0 < c < cI
otherwise
(26)
fcD1−σ = coZ
cI
cµD(c)dc (27)
ecI1−σ = 1G(cI)
cIZ
0
c1−σµI(c)dc (28)
ec1−σ = 1
M
h
MI(γ ecI)1−σ +MDfcD1−σi (29)
µI(c) and µD(c) are not affected by the simultaneous entry and exit since the successful entrants
and failing incumbents draw their productivity level from a common distribution and δ is inde-
pendent of the innovation status. These distributions depend exclusively on the cutoffs points for
entry and innovation.
Aggregate variables
Denote byMI andMD respectively the mass of active innovator and domestic (non-innovator)
producers, where
MI =
G(cI)
G(co)
M (30)
MD =
G(co)−G(cI)
G(co)
M (31)
and M is the mass of incumbent firms in the economy. It can be shown that:
P 1−σ =
cIZ
0
MI [pI(c)]
1−σµI(c)dc+
coZ
cI
MD [pD(c)]
1−σ µD(c)dc =M [pD(ec)]1−σ
R =
cIZ
0
MIrI(c)µI(c)dc+
coZ
cI
MDrD(c)µD(c)dc =MrD(c˜) =Mr
Π =
cIZ
0
MIπI(c)µI(c)dc+
coZ
cI
MDπD(c)µD(c)dc =MπD(c˜) =Mπ¯ (32)
where r and π are the average revenue and profit in the economy. Moreover, using the labour
market condition in equilibrium it can be shown that:
M =
R
r
=
L
σ(π + fD +
G(cI)
G(co)
δfI)
(33)
Note we can use the first line of (32) together with (30), (31), (25) and (26) to rewrite (10) as:
cIR
0
πI(c)dG(c) +
coR
cI
πD(c)dG(c) = G(co)π (34)
which is (10).
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5.1.1 Determination of the equilibrium
Using (32) together with (30) and (31), it is possible to express (10) as (34), which can be further
refined and express in terms of solely co. Insert (8) and (9) into (10), replace δfI = Ψ(γ1−σ−1)fD
and rearrange terms to get:
δfE = G(cI)γ
1−σ
µ ecI
co
¶1−σ
fD −G(cI)
µfcD
co
¶1−σ
fD −G(cI)Ψ(γ1−σ − 1)fD +
+G(co)
µfcD
co
¶1−σ
fD −G(co)fD (35)
= fD
£
jD(co) + γ
1−σjI(co)
¤
where
jD(co) = G(co)
"µfcD
co
¶1−σ
− 1
#
−G(cI)
"µfcD
co
¶1−σ
−Ψ
#
(36)
jI(co) = G(cI)
"µ ecI
co
¶1−σ
−Ψ
#
(37)
5.1.2 Existence and Uniqueness of the equilibrium in the closed economy
Proposition 4 Under autarky, the equilibrium exists and is unique.
Proof. We shall prove that the RHS of (35) is monotonically increasing in co on the domain
[0, c], so that co is uniquely determined by the intersection of the latter curve with the flat line δfe
in the [0, c] space. Recall that ecI is a function of cI (see (28)), which, in turn, is a function of
co by (11). Let us define Λ = Ψ1/1−σ. First, note that (11) implies
∂cI
∂co
= Ψ1/1−σ = Λ and (28)
implies ∂∂co
³
?cI1−σ
c1−σo
´
= Λ g(cI)G(cI)
∙
Ψ−
³
?cI
co
´1−σ¸
−
³
?cI
co
´1−σ
1−σ
co
. It follows:
∂jI(co)
∂co
= −1− σ
co
G(cI)
µ ecI
co
¶1−σ
≥ 0 (38)
Using (27) and following similar steps we get:
∂jD(co)
∂co
= −1− σ
co
[G(co)−G(cI)]
µfcD
co
¶1−σ
≥ 0 (39)
(38) and (39) ensure that the RHS of (35) is an increasing function of co. Furthermore, lim
co→c
jI(co) = ∞, and lim
co→c
jD(co) = a < ∞, so that lim
co→c
£
jD(co) + γ1−σjI(co)
¤
= ∞. In order to
show that the RHS of (35) goes to 0 as co goes to 0, I will follow Melitz (2003) and show that the
elasticities of jI(co) and jD(co) are positive and jI(co) is always bounded away from 0.
∂jI(co)
∂co
co
jI(co)
= −(1− σ)
∙
1 +
Λ
jI(co)
¸
≥ −(1− σ)
∂jD(co)
∂co
co
jD(co)
= −(1− σ)
⎡
⎢⎣
(G(co)−G(cI))
³
?cD
co
´1−σ
jD(co)
⎤
⎥⎦ ≥ 0
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Therefore the RHS of (35) is monotonically increasing in the space (0, c) and it must cross the
horizontal curve δfE only once. The equilibrium co exists and it is unique.
Once the unique co is determined, (25) and (26) can be determined as well as (27) to (29). By
(11) follows cI , while by (34) follows π.
5.2 Appendix B - Comparison of our entry cutoff with Melitz’s (2003) in the
closed economy
Proposition 5 Let denote c∗M as the cutoff level of marginal cost found in Melitz (2003) for the
closed economy. Then we have that:
c0 < c∗M
Proof. Since (8) and R = L are common to both models, the ratio of the entry cost-cutoff is given
by:
c∗M
c0
=
P ∗M
P
where
P ∗M =
⎛
⎜⎝
cIZ
0
(p(c))1−σ g(c)dc+
c∗MZ
cI
(p(c))1−σ g(c)dc
⎞
⎟⎠
1
1−σ
P =
⎛
⎝
cIZ
0
(γp(c))1−σ g(c)dc+
c0Z
cI
(p(c))1−σ g(c)dc
⎞
⎠
1
1−σ
Assume that:
c0 > c∗M
This implies that :
cIZ
0
(p(c))1−σ g(c)dc+
c∗MZ
cI
(p(c))1−σ g(c)dc >
cIZ
0
(γp(c))1−σ g(c)dc+
c0Z
cI
(p(c))1−σ g(c)dc.
and, rearranging terms, we have:
(1− γ1−σ)
cIZ
0
(p(c))1−σ g(c)dc >
c0Z
cI
(p(c))1−σ g(c)dc.−
c∗MZ
cI
(p(c))1−σ g(c)dc.
which is not possible since, γ < 1, σ > 1, c0 > c∗M .
Q.E.D
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5.3 Appendix C - Open economy - selection BW
5.3.1 Aggregation
Cost Distributions and productivity indexes
Let µD(c) = g(c)/[G(co)−G(cX)], µX(c) = g(c)/[G(cX)−G(cI)], µXI(c) = g(c)/[G(cI)] denote
the distribution of cost level in each subgroup prior to innovation. Let fcX1−σ = cXR
cI
c1−σµX(c)dc
and MDfcD1−σ +MXfcX1−σ =MNIgcNI1−σ.
Aggregate variables
P 1−σ =
MT
ρ1−σ
½
1
MT
h
MNIgcNI1−σ +MXIγ1−σ ecI1−σ + nτ1−σ(MXfcX1−σ +MXIγ1−σ ecI1−σ)i¾| {z }
?c1−σ
(40)
where ec1−σ is again the weighted average productivity index of the economy. As in the closed
economy it can be shown that
R =Mr¯ =MT rD(ec)
π¯ =
r
σ
− fD −
G(cI)
G(co)
δfI −
G(cX)
G(co)
nδfX . (41)
5.3.2 Existence and Uniqueness of the trading equilibrium
(14) to (16) as well as (19) and (20) allow us to rearrange the FE conveniently for the characterizing
the equilibrium as a function of only co and cX :
δfE
G(co)
=
(
(1− prXI)
∙gcNI
co
¸1−σ
+ prXIγ
1−σ
∙ ecI
co
¸1−σ
− 1
)
fD − δfIprXI + (42)
+
(
prX
prEXP
∙fcX
cX
¸1−σ
+
prXI
prEXP
γ1−σ
∙ ecI
cX
¸1−σ
− 1
)
prEXPnδfX
δfE =
£
lNI(co) + γ
1−σlI(co)
¤
fD +
£
lNI(cX) + γ
1−σlI(cX)
¤
nδfX
where prEXP = G(cX)/G(co) and
lNI(co) = G(co)
"∙gcNI
co
¸1−σ
− 1
#
−G(cI)
"∙gcNI
co
¸1−σ
−Ψf
#
lI(co) = G(cI)
"∙ ecI
co
¸1−σ
−Ψf
#
lNI(cX) = G(cX)
"∙fcX
cX
¸1−σ
− 1
#
−G(cI)
"∙fcX
cX
¸1−σ
−ΨfX
#
lI(cX) = G(cI)
"∙ ecI
cX
¸1−σ
−ΨfX
#
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Proposition 6 Assume (17) holds. In the open economy, the equilibrium arising under selection
BW exists and is unique.
Proof. We proceed similarly as in the proof for the closed economy and we shall prove that the
RHS of (42) is monotonically increasing in co on the interval [0, c]. By (38), lI(co) is monotonically
increasing in co and lI(cX) is monotonically increasing in cX from zero to infinity on c ∈ [0, c]. In
turn, cX is increasing in co from (21). Similarly by (39), lNI(co) and lNI(cX) are monotonically
increasing from 0 to infinity respectively in co and cX belonging to [0, c]. Hence, the RHS of (42)
is a monotonic increasing function from 0 to ∞ in the [0, c] space, while the LHS is a flat line.
The equilibrium cost-cutoff level co must then be unique.
5.3.3 Comparison of the entry cost-cutoff in autarky and in trade
To compare the equilibrium entry cost-cutoff of autarky cAo with the one arising in the BW -
equilibrium cfo , it is useful to re-arrange (42) in a more convenient way as:
δfE =
h
jD(c
f
o ) + γ
1−σjI(c
f
o )
i
fD + Γ (43)
where
Γ =
(∙fcX
cX
¸1−σ
− G(c
f
I )
G(cX)
∙fcX
cX
¸1−σ
+ γ1−σ
G(cfI )
G(cX)
∙ ecI
cX
¸1−σ
− 1
)
G(cX)nδfX ≥ 0
The first term of the RHS in (43) is exactly the same as in the closed economy. If Γ were 0, (35)
and (43) would yield the same solution, i.e. cfo = cAo . Since Γ is positive the curve representing
the RHS of (43) must lie above the curve representing the RHS of (35), implying a lower entry
cost-cutoff in the trading equilibrium than in the autarky equilibrium. That is, cfo ≤ cAo .
5.3.4 Proposition 1 - In BW, trade increases the proportion of firms performing
process-innovation
Proposition 1. If (22) and (17) hold, then the innovation cutoff in the open economy is lower
than in autarky (i.e cfI < c
A
I ).
Proof. Use (11) and (19) to get:Ã
cAI
cfI
!k
= (1 + nτ1−σ)
k
1−σ
µ
π¯f
π¯A
¶
which depends on the ratio of both profits. Using the expressions for µD, µX , µXI , prX , prXI we
rewrite (18) as:
π¯f =
δfE
G(cfo )
(44)
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where π¯f is (41).
and Using (10) and (44) combined with (22) we get:
π¯f
π¯A
=
µ
cAo
cfo
¶k
Let us define some useful transformations: i.e.: Λ = Ψ
1
1−σ , Λ∗ = Ψf
1
1−σ ,and Λ∗ = αβ where:
α =
µ
τ1−σfI
(γ1−σ − 1)(1 + nτ1−σ)fX
¶ 1
1−σ
β =
µ
δfX
fD
τσ−1
¶ 1
1−σ
(45)
(42) can then be expressed as a function of the parameters of the model:
π¯f =
∙
k
k + 1− σ
h
(1− Λk+1−σ) + γ1−σΛk+1−σ
i
− 1
¸
fD − δfIΛk +
∙
k
k + 1− σ
h
(1− αk+1−σ) + γ1−σαk+1−σ
i
− 1
¸
βknδfX
Using the definition of Λ,(45) and the fact that Λ∗ = (1+ nτ1−σ)
1
σ−1Λ and rearranging terms:
π¯f =
∙
k
k + 1− σ
£
Λ1−σ(γ1−σ − 1)
¤
fD − δfI
¸
Λ∗k +
σ − 1
k + 1− σfD (46)
+
σ − 1
k + 1− σβ
knδfX
and expanding (35):
π¯A =
∙
k
k + 1− σ
£
Λ1−σ(γ1−σ − 1)
¤
fD − δfI
¸
Λk +
σ − 1
k + 1− σfD
Then, Ã
cAI
cfI
!k
=
(1 + nτ1−σ)
k
σ−1A+B +C
(1 + nτ1−σ)
k
σ−1A+ (1 + nτ1−σ)
k
σ−1B
(47)
where
A = [
k
k + 1− σ
£
Λ1−σ(γ1−σ − 1)
¤
fD − δfIΛk (48)
B =
σ − 1
k + 1− σfD (49)
C =
σ − 1
k + 1− σβ
knδfX (50)
We have to show that :
cAI
cfI
< 1⇒ ((1 + nτ1−σ)
k
σ−1 − 1)B > C
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Substituting (49),(50), the inequality becomes:
(1 + nτ1−σ)
k
σ−1 > 1 +
µ
δfX
fD
¶k+1−σ
1−σ
τ−kn
To show that this inequality holds true, note that β < 1 implies:µ
δfX
fD
¶k+1−σ
1−σ
τ−kn < nτ1−σ ⇒ 1 +
µ
δfX
fD
¶k+1−σ
1−σ
τ−kn < 1 + nτ1−σ
It follows:
(1 + nτ1−σ)
k
σ−1 > (1 + nτ1−σ) > 1 +
µ
δfX
fD
¶k+1−σ
1−σ
τ−kn
since k > σ − 1 is assumed.
5.3.5 Lemma 2
Lemma 2. Assume (22) and (17) hold. Trade liberalization will have positive effects in innovation,
i.e. dcI/dτ ≤ 0.
Proof. Combining (19) with (22), we get that:
G(cI) = Ψ
f k
1−σG(cfo )
Substitute (44) and the value of Ψf
k
1−σ into this expression to get:
(G(cI))
−1 = f ; f = (1 + nτ1−σ)
k
1−σ π¯fΘ
where Θ is a constant independent of τ , so that from now on we shall ignore it because it does
not affect the derivative. Totally differentiating both sides of this expression w.r.t. τ , we obtain
the following:
dcI
dτ
=
df
dτ
d(G(cI))
−1
dcI
Since the denominator is negative, it is enough to show dfdτ > 0 for
dcI
dτ < 0. Use (46), (48) to (50)
and recall Λ∗ = (1 + nτ1−σ)
1
σ−1Λ to expand f in the following way:
f = A+
B
(1 + nτ1−σ)
k
σ−1
+
C
(1 + nτ1−σ)
k
σ−1
where A,B,C are defined as in (48) to (50) and A is independent of τ . Using (45) and (50), it is
convenient to express C = λφ
k
σ−1 ., with φ ≡ τ1−σ, so that:
df
dφ
=
λφ
k+1−σ
σ−1 (1 + nφ)
k
σ−1 − (1 + nφ)
k+1−σ
σ−1 φ
k
σ−1λn−Bn(1 + nφ)
k+1−σ
σ−1
(1 + nφ)
2k
σ−1
Rearranging terms:
df
dφ
=
∙
λφ
k
σ−1 1
φ(1+nφ) −B
n
1+nφ
¸
(1 + nφ)
k
σ−1
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Since we are deriving f with respect to φ (instead of τ) and σ > 1, the numerator is negative (i.e.
df
dτ > 0) iff:
φ
k+1−σ
σ−1 <
B
λ
n
and substituting for the values of B and λ, we get:
φ =
fD
δfX
and:
τ ≤
µ
δfX
fD
¶ 1
1−σ
which satisfies our parameter restrictions (17).
5.3.6 Lemma 3
Lemma 3. Assume (22) holds. cx is monotonically decreasing in τ and fx.
Proof. Combining (21) with (22) gives the following equality:
G(cX) = β
kG(co)
Substitute (44) and (45) into this expression to get:
(G(cX))
−1 = ζτkπ¯f = g (51)
where ζ =
³
δfX
fD
´ k
σ−1 is constant with respect to tariffs.
Proceeding similarly to the proof above, we take the total differential of both sides of (51)
w.r.t. τ , so that the response of the exporting cost cutoff to changes in the transportation costs is
given by:
dcX
dτ
=
dg
dτ
d(G(cX))−1
dcX
Since the denominator is negative, we need to prove dgdτ > 0 for
dcX
dτ < 0. Substituting
(46),(48),(49),(50) into (51), g is a function given by:
g = ζτk(1 + nτ1−σ)
k
σ−1A+ ζτkB + ζτkC
or, substituting for the value of C, g can be conveniently expanded as:
g = ζ(τk(σ−1) + nτ (k−1)(σ−1))
k
σ−1A+ ζτkB +Φ
where Φ = (σ−1)nk+1−σ (δfX). It follows
dg
dτ > 0.
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To prove that dcX/dfX ≤ 0 we totally differentiate both sides of (51) w.r.t. fX and obtain the
following:
dcX
dfX
=
dg
dfX
d(G(cX))−1
dcX
Note that dgdfX > 0 as
dζ
dfX
> 0, dωdfX > 0 and A,B are independent of fX . Recalling that the
denominator is negative, it follows that dcXdfX ≤ 0 - Q.E.D.
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